Abstract In this paper we evaluate the impact of colonialism on development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the world context, colonialism had very heterogeneous effects, operating through many mechanisms, sometimes encouraging development sometimes retarding it. In the African case, however, this heterogeneity is muted, making an assessment of the average effect more interesting. We emphasize that to draw conclusions it is necessary not just to know what actually happened to development during the colonial period, but also to take a view on what might have happened without colonialism and also to take into account the legacy of colonialism. We argue that in the light of plausible counter-factuals, colonialism probably had a uniformly negative effect on development in Africa. To develop this claim we distinguish between three sorts of colonies: (1) those which coincided with a pre-colonial centralized state, (2) those of white settlement, (3) the rest. Each have distinct performance within the colonial period, different counter-factuals and varied legacies.
Introduction
What is the impact of colonialism on the economic development of Sub-Saharan Africa (Africa) or more generally the colonized countries? This is a question which has reverberated though the social sciences for over a century. In the context of the late 19th Century "Scramble for Africa", Marxists like Lenin formed an unlikely consensus with colonial administrators in believing that European colonization would have very positive effects on African economic development. By 1926 a British academic was writing of an " Economic Revolution in British West Africa" unleashed by the colonial powers on backward Africa (McPhee, 1926) . This consensus between left and right continues to the present, with Lenin being replaced by Birnberg and Resnick (1975) , Warren (1980) , and Sender and  We are grateful to Jan Vansina for his suggestions and advice. We have also benefitted greatly from many discussions with Daron Acemoglu, Robert Bates, Philip Osafo-Kwaako, Jon Weigel and Neil Parsons on the topic of this research. Finally, we thank Johannes Fedderke, Ewout Frankema and Pim de Zwart for generously providing us with their data. Smith (1986) , who argue that the empirical evidence is consistent with the Marxist view that imperialism has dragged Africa closer to capitalism, and colonial administrators being replaced by Bauer (1972) and Ferguson (2002 Ferguson ( , 2011 . Interestingly, these scholars refer to many of the same empirical outcomes though starting from a different set of presumptions about the intentions of the colonizers. Perhaps even more interesting, they often have the same counter-factual in mindwithout colonial intervention Africa would have stayed backward. Opposed to this eccentric consensus is a vast literature blaming colonization for all the ills of former colonies, including persistent poverty and dictatorship.
Colonialism is neither a European phenomenon, nor is it restricted to the Scramble for Africa In this essay we restrict attention to European colonization and focus on Africa since this has been the crucible of much of the academic debate and where the literature spans the entire spectrum of answers. We also restrict our attention to formal colonization rather than more general 'interaction' with potential colonial powers or the type of 'informal empires' postulated to exist by Gallagher and Robinson (1953) . This means we leave a lot out. In the context of African development for instance we put aside the issue of the impact of the Atlantic and other slave trades on the development of Africa (Lovejoy, 1989 , Nunn, 2008 except to the extent that it molds the initial conditions at the time of colonization. We also set aside the question of whether the huge adverse health effects of colonialism were really just due to 'contact' (and thus would invariably have happened in the wake of simple trade expansion) or can be attributed to colonialism. We also focus simply on the impact of colonialism for the development of the colonies not the colonizing country, even though this is an important topic (Williams, 1944, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005) .
The obvious reason for the very wide dispersion of views about the role of colonialism is that it is very difficult to construct a convincing research design to examine its impact. Without such a systematic approach ideology has much more scope for allowing scholars to pick and choose facts which fit into their view of the world. Central is the problem that there is not a well defined counter-factual to answer the question: what would the income per-capita of Ghana be today if it had not been colonized? Though a few countries were not colonized by the Europeans such as China, Iran, Japan, and Thailand, one cannot use these as a control group because it is surely not a coincidence that these countries were not colonized, potentially biasing the findings. In other cases, such as Barbados or Mauritius which were uninhabited at the time of colonization, the counter-factual question becomes exceedingly speculative.
Nevertheless, it is also clear from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002 ) that colonialism had very heterogeneous effects. It seems difficult to believe that in any plausible counter-factual Australia or the United States would today have higher GDP per-capita if they had not been colonized. 3 At the same time, as we will argue in the essay it is difficult (for us) to believe that the income per-capita of Botswana or Ghana would not be higher today had it not been colonized (as we argue in detail later). Even though Botswana has been an economic success since independence in 1966 this was not because of colonialism, but despite it (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2003 , Leith, 2005 , Parsons and Robinson, 2006 . Other cases are of course much more ambiguous. Most parts of Africa did not have the types of centralized political institutions that Botswana or Ghana had and even when they did they were often much less accountable and militarized, as in Buganda, Rwanda or Zululand.
Because colonialism was such a heterogeneous phenomenon taking different forms and interacting with different circumstances this means that it is not very interesting to inquire as to what the average effect of colonialism was on development. Of course this would not be true if ones approach was normative. We do not believe that colonialism could have ever have been good according to any coherent normative criteria. When the focus is on development, income per-capita, average educational attainment, or average life expectancy, however, one cannot generally say colonialism was good or bad independent of context. If one accepts this position, then our inability to propose a definitive identification strategy to estimate "the causal effect of colonialism on development" turns out to be less of a problem. There is no one causal effect, but rather different effects working through different mechanisms and channels. Sometimes the net effect of these in a country is (almost surely) positive (Australia) sometimes it is (probably) negative (Botswana and Ghana) . The more interesting thing is to conceptualize the mechanisms via which colonialism 3 This is not a statement about welfare since it is easy to argue that the indigenous people are much worse off than they would have been absent colonialism. In both Australia and the United States the vast majority of indigenous people were wiped out by the diseases imported by the Europeans and their ancestors today experience levels of human development far below the average of their societies. In Australia, for example, life expectancy of aboriginal people is 17 years less than non-indigenous people and average income about 62% of the non-indigenous level (see Australian Human Rights Commission, 2008) .
influenced development and try to investigate empirically how these worked. Providing causal estimates of the impact of specific mechanisms may be much more feasible and, subject to issues of external validity, it may even then be possible to aggregate these as one way to come to a conclusion about the net effect of colonialism.
That being said when the focus is on Africa the types of heterogeneity which characterize colonialism more generally are muted. There is no success story like Australia or the United States from which economically dynamic settler economies emerged. Moreover, we believe that it is possible to make some sensible counter-factual conjectures. This will be far from a definitive empirical exercise and it is offered more in the spirit of focusing the issues where we believe they should be focused. This being the case we do not restrict ourselves simply to mechanisms but also construct what we believe what the development consequences of colonialism were in Africa in the light of plausible counter-factuals. 4 We emphasize four basic points that are critical in evaluating the African experience. First, at a purely factual level the impact of colonialism on development differed greatly within Africa. The broad pattern of GDP per-capita is that on average this increased in the places for which there is reliable data relative to the base year of around 1885. This is quite plausible. Europeans brought technology, such as railways and mining techniques and integrated their colonies more fully into world trade taking advantage of existing patterns of comparative advantage. Agriculture and mining exports certainly expanded relative to what they were at the time of the scramble for Africa.
Nevertheless, the rates of economic growth were extremely modest. Existing incomplete data also suggests that stature and life expectancy improved as did literacy and educational attainment from very low bases (Prados de la Escosura, 2011, brings much of the available evidence together).
Second, and still at a factual level, that this happened on average does not imply that everybody's living standards increased. Of particular relevance is the impact on African living standards. This appears to have differed depending on the type of colony. In Southern Africa and the white settler colonies simple calculations about the immizerizing impact of land expropriation and the creation of 'dual economies ' (Palmer and Parsons, 1977 , Bundy, 1979 , Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012 on African incomes suggests that Africans experienced a severe deterioration in living standards as the consequence of colonialism. Indeed, given the extent of land expropriated from Africans by Europeans, living standards might have fallen by about 50%. These calculations are supported by evidence on real wages (Wilson, 1972 , Mosley, 1983 , Bowden and Mosley, 2010 , de Zwart, 2011 .
4 See Austin (2010) for a rare attempt to tackle the same question.
Falling African incomes in conjunction with rising average incomes implies that there was a huge increase in inequality as the consequence of colonialism. Outside of the settler colonies the situation was different. There is evidence that nominal and real wages in the formal sector increased in British
West Africa (Bowden and Mosley, 2010, Frankema and van Waijenburg, 2011) . This evidence of course tells us little about what was happening to the living standards of the vast mass of rural people.
However, other evidence on development outcomes is relevant here. For example, recent research has shown that the stature of military recruits increased in Ghana and also British East Africa during the colonial period (Moradi, 2008 , 2009 , Austin, Baten and Moradi, 2011 institutions, absent colonialism Africans could have adopted or innovated these themselves. In addition any of this data has to be seen in the context of pre-existing trends and international comparisons. Even in the absence of colonialism, technology diffuses across countries, including medical technology, and there are other instruments of diffusion such as missionaries who played a significant role in the spread of education before and during the colonial period in Africa (Nunn, 2012 , Frankema, 2010 independence. Yet just as with interpreting the evidence for the colonial period, to be able to interpret the post-colonial evidence one also needs a counter-factual. Post-independence Africa looked nothing like it would have done in the absence of colonialism. Indeed, we will argue that in most cases post-independence economic decline in Africa can be explicitly attributed to colonialism because the types of mechanisms that led to this decline were creations of colonial society and institutions which persisted.
Bringing all the pieces of information and conceptual issues together we argue in this essay that in two sorts of colonies there is a clear case to be made for colonialism retarding development; those with centralized state at the time of Scramble for Africa and those of white settlement. In the former, just the assumption that the previous patterns of political development would continue is sufficient to argue that these countries would be more developed today. Colonialism not only blocked further political development, but indirect rule made local elites less accountable to their citizens. After independence, even if these states had a coherence others lacked, they had far more predatory rulers.
It is true that the colonial powers brought technology and institutions that Africans did not have, but
Africans in these types of polities were busy adopting these in any case in the 19th century and they were the most capable of doing so. These polities also suffered from the uniform colonial legacies of racism, stereotypes and miss-conceptions that the Africans did not have and which have since caused immense problems, most notably in Burundi and Rwanda.
In colonies of white settlement the most important factor was that the highly extractive nature of colonial rule and land grabs manifested themselves, as we noted, in quite serious immizerization of development in Zimbabwe under Ndebele or Shona rule prior to the annexation of the country by the British South Africa Company. Nevertheless, other sources (e.g. Bundy, 1979) suggest that rural Africans in southern Africa were quite capable of responding to economic incentives and investing and adopting new technology. The evolution of the international dissemination and diffusion of technology plus the relative absence of slavery in this part of African makes it likely that, absent colonialism, African living standards would have slowly improved. This, plus the large increases in inequality and the racial and ethnic conflicts bequeathed to these colonies after the end of colonialism, make it plausible that development outcomes in places such as Zimbabwe would be better today and over the last century had it not been colonized.
The third set of cases are more complex because we do not argue that the pre-colonial institutions of Somalia, for example, were conducive to development or were undergoing a process of state
formation. Yet even in many of these more ambiguous cases it seems hard to us to make a strong case in favor of colonialism actually fostering development that otherwise would not have taken place. It could be, to consider Uganda, that the British brought stability by stopping long-running conflicts between the pre-colonial states of Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole or Tooro and that they brought technology that the Africans would not otherwise have had. Yet the evidence suggests that even these societies were very ready to adopt better technology when it appeared (see Reid, 2002, on Buganda) and any gains that there might have been in terms of stability were reversed when the British left in 1962, bequeathing to the " Ugandans" a polity with no workable social contract the result of which has been 50 years of political instability, military dictatorships and civil war with the conflicts often, interestingly, mirroring the patterns of pre-colonial conflicts (on this see Reid, 2007 , and the sequel, Reid, 2011 and Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2012) . As for other benefits, for example infrastructure, the Bugandan state had constructed an extensive system of roads prior to being colonized (Reid, 2002, Chapter 5) . Though these colonies did not have the same level of inequality or heightened race relations as settler colonies did after independence, they shared many of the other problems.
All in all, we find it difficult to bring the available evidence together with plausible counter-factuals to argue that there is any country today in Sub-Saharan Africa which is more developed because it was colonized by Europeans. Quite the contrary.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we summarize briefly our views on the nature of African economic development at the start of the colonial period as a base for the main discussion.
Section 3 reviews in more detail the basic facts about what happened to various development outcomes during and after the colonial period (roughly from 1885 to 2010). Section 4 then discusses in more detail some mechanisms which have been proposed as connecting colonialism and development and we try to evaluate the evidence from them. Section 5 then proposes our very speculative balance of the evidence in more detail and section 6 concludes.
African Development on the Eve of the Scramble
To understand the impact of colonialism it is important to put it in the context of the level of African development in 1885. One of the main pieces of evidence for those who favor the conjecture that colonialism was good for development is that Africa was very poor in 1885 compared to the rest of the world. It had backward technology indicative of which was that writing, the wheel and plow were not used in Africa outside of Ethiopia (Goody, 1971 , Law, 1980 , Austen and Headrick, 1983 . Some societies, for instance the pre-colonial Rwandan state, did not even use money. Though it is hotly debated, some would also argue that Africa did not have economic institutions which were conducive to development (see the debate between Hopkins, 1973 and Dalton, 1976) . We would argue (following Acemoglu, and Robinson, 2010 Robinson, , 2012 ) that the preponderance of evidence is more consistent with the view espoused by Dalton. Table 1 reproduces evidence from Dalton (1976) based on studies by the United Nations from the 1950s. It illustrates that even in the late colonial period most Africans were engaged in subsistence activities outside of the formal economy. Other evidence on economic institutions comes from the fact that slavery was endemic in the 19th century, with various estimates suggesting that in West Africa the proportion of slaves in the population was between 1/3 and 1/2 (Lovejoy, 2000, surveys the evidence). It is also true that the state tended to heavily limit the extent of private enterprise, for instance in Asante (Wilks, 1989) and Dahomey (Law, 1977 , Manning, 2004 . One could also argue that other types of economic institutions were not conducive to development, for example Goldstein and Udry (2008) , show that in contemporary Ghana the fact that land rights are allocated by chiefs means that nobody without political connections has secure property rights. Though this situation is partly a consequence of the impact of indirect rule, at least to some extent it mirrors the pre-colonial situation as well.
Leaving aside economic institutions, when considering development, the nature of state and political institutions are also critical. Improvements in health, education and infrastructure typically require actions by the state and investments in public goods. Some African states did provide public goods: for example Asante, Buganda, Dahomey, and Ethiopia all built extensive road systems and many provided legal systems and methods of conflict resolution (the Kuba state even independently created trial by a jury of one's peers, see Vansina, 1978 Londo, which were. Nevertheless, even the territorial states were not bureaucratized and did not collect systematic taxes from their inhabitants, though they did collect tribute and organize compulsory labor and armies. It is very difficult to imagine these states providing infrastructure or cooperating to build a railway, for example. Lack of political centralization clearly had important implications for development, for example in terms of the provision of order (see Speke, 1863 , Douglas, 1962 or Colson, 1969 . This can be seen empirically using the Standard
Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) a database of " pre-modern" or perhaps " traditional" societies coded by anthropologists over many decades (see Murdock and White, 1969) . The SCCS contains a coding of the extent of political centralization and Osafo- Kwaako and Robinson (2012) show that this is very strongly positively correlated with the provision of public goods, such as roads, money, and the existence of written record keeping. It is also positively related to measures of economic development, for example the existence of loom weaving or metal smelting (though one has to be very cautious in asserting anything about the causal relationships between these variables). All in all we believe that the evidence is consistent with the view that development outcomes and probably potential in Africa prior to the Scramble for Africa were bad compared to the rest of the world. 7 The evidence from Table 1 is consistent with this and the heavy involvement of the state in trade and commerce and the incidence of slavery meant that economic institutions in Africa were not conducive to the spread of modern technologies or the basics of economic growth. This situation was further exacerbated by the relative lack of political centralization, even though clear processes of centralization were taking place in parts of the continent. Still, the fact that Africa was behind economically in 1885 implies nothing about the impact of colonialism. It does imply that there was plenty of scope for colonialism to improve institutions, thus boosting development, but this does not imply that colonialism actually did so. For instance, even though slavery in Africa was abolished during colonialism, though it took decades, it was abolished in other non-colonial places at more or less the same time, suggesting that it probably would have happened in any case.
Patterns of Development during and after Colonialism
We now present some basic facts about the evolution of development during and after the colonial period. The natural place to start is with estimates of income per-capita updated from the work of
Maddison (2007) Elsewhere the numbers were much higher, 15.6% in Zambia and 47.1% in Malawi. Like income per-capita, school enrollment improved from very low levels. The situation with literacy is similar.
Prados de la Escosura's estimates (2011 Table D Assume that output is generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function using land and labor as inputs and subject to constant returns to scale and assume that factor markets are competitive. This last assumption is clearly not the case for the examples we are looking at, since there was extensive coercion of black labor and wages were no doubt forced below competitive levels. In this case however our estimates will provide some sort of lower bound for the impact.
Under these assumptions we can say that Africans ought to be paid the value of their marginal product and hence prior to land expropriation we have
where A is total factor productivity and 0<α<1 is a constant. Now using the statistic for South Africa that the Native Land Act of 1913 allocated 7% of land to Africans we have that after land expropriation African living standards are given by to a 59% decline in African living standards. Note that this calculation is completely unchanged if one assumes that Africans were being paid the value of the average product before and after land expropriation.
8 That this figure is quite reasonable is seen from looking at de Zwart's (2011) data.
Though his data comes only from the Cape Colony and is before the 1913 Land Act he finds, using a barebones consumption basket, an approximate 50% fall in African real wages. As noted above this number also appears in Bowden and Mosley (2010) . Wilson (1972) found a smaller fall but of course the reality is that the 1913 act just institutionalized a process that had been ongoing for a long time.
Wilson's data may therefore reflect more the introduction and intensification of the Colour Bar and it is possible that the smaller fall in wages is also due to the fact that gold miners were a labor aristocracy and in high demand relative to other African workers.
Nevertheless, this calculation is of course only relevant to places where colonists engaged in large land grabs. The fact that income per-capita rose in many places but the real wages of Africans fell suggests that there ought to have been very large increases in inequality. Unfortunately there is very little work reconstructing historical data from Africa. Figure 6 shows the data from one study that does exist, Bigsten (1986 Bigsten ( , 1987 
, Luiz, Pereira and Oliveira (2011) and Fedderke (2010, 2011) has used contemporary codings of economic and political institutions and extended these back to the colonial period for a number of African colonies. Figure 7 plots the data for some of these countries for an index of political freedoms, which has never been coded for colonies before (since these are not included in datasets such as POLITY). Unfortunately, with the exception of Namibia and Tanzania, the data does not cover the entire colonial period and even there it does not extend into the pre-colonial period. An interesting question is whether or not colonialism led to a severe contraction in political freedom. Certainly Africans had no political power in the early colonial period, but the change has to be compared to pre-colonial African polities. Indeed, the index is based on such things as voting rights, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, the extent of arbitrary executive power, government secrecy or indemnity, due process of law and freedom of movement. It is obviously a tall order to code these variables for the colonial period, let alone the pre-colonial period and it is not a priori obvious in which way colonialism changed these variables. open to talent and upward mobility than the colonial system of chiefs and we discuss this in more detail later in the case of Sierra Leone. In other cases, for example Somalia prior to colonialism, there was a quite democratic structure of political rights which was common in stateless societies so that adult males made collective decisions for the clans by consensus or sometimes something more like majority rule. Thus it is plausible that on average the political rights of Africans did decline with the imposition of colonial rule and this is an issue which could be researched using ethnographic information, for example from the Murdock Ethnographic Atlas or the SCCS.
Leaving this issue aside Figure 7 shows some very interesting patterns. In the case of Namibia political rights fall almost monotonically through from colonization by the Germans in 1884 up until independence from South Africa in 1990. In Tanzania they decline non-stop until after the second world war. Interestingly the takeover of Tanzania by Britain from Germany after the first world war coincides with a deterioration rather than an improvement of political rights. The pattern of deteriorating political rights is quite common and shows up similarly in the case on Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This increases rapidly around the time of independence only to fall back again as African leaders consolidated one-party states and outlawed political competition. Improvements in political rights then begin again in the 1990s with the wave of democratizations that rolled over the continent. Figure 8 shows the data from these studies on the extent of private property rights. This index is very interesting because it is meant to capture the property rights for the mass of the population. In this case one can say something more definitive about the consequences of transition from pre-colonial to colonial rule, at least in the colonies with significant white settlement. The massive expropriation of land from Africans must surely coincide with a significant deterioration in the security of property rights for the vast mass of the population. Figure 8 reveals no obvious general pattern during the colonial period. In some places, such as Malawi, Namibia or South Africa, property rights deteriorate. In other places they stay constant or increase. There does not however seem to be a general positive effect of colonialism on the extent of private property rights and even when the data is truncated so that, for example, they do not include the mass land expropriations that took place in South Africa or Zimbabwe.
How are we to make sense of these various findings? Some of them seem quite contradictory.
For example, how can expanding education and life expectancy after independence coincide with falling income per-capita? From a production function point of view these things must be reconciled by large falls in total factor productivity (see Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2007 , for such a calculation in the case of Burundi) suggesting that capital was very inefficiently used. This was precisely the conclusion of Pritchett (2001) who argued that the most likely reason why expanding educational attainment in the developing world did not show up as increased income is that poor institutions lead to human capital to be allocated to unproductive activities such as rent seeking.
Another puzzle is the simultaneous evidence of increasing stature and falling real wages for Africans, for example in Kenya. One possibility is suggested by the work of Troesken (2004) who showed how in the 19th century US enfranchised whites were prepared to invest in public health investments which benefited blacks and poor whites to the extent that they were themselves threatened by the negative externalities which diseased blacks and poor people could create. If the blacks came down with cholera it would quite likely spill over to the whites. It is quite likely that this could help explain the simultaneous occurrence of falling real wages and improving stature. For example, in the case of Zimbabwe Phimister (1988, p. 261 ) quotes a white official as observing the need to ".. tackle infectious disease in the native ... if we want to have a healthy white nation" and Phimister quotes from a 1944 report of the native production trade commission that " "drastic and immediate action" was needed with respect to the appalling public health conditions and it was "not only humane, it is mere self-protection" ... Health services for the African had become essential because "... as we want to have a healthy white nation we have got to tackle infectious diseases in the native. The native is the reservoir of these infectious diseases ". Though this may have ultimately been good for the health of Africans it is not exactly the civilizing mission.
Despite quite a few puzzles the overall picture is quite clear. and quite a few others during the 1980s. Meanwhile real living standards of Africans experienced severe deterioration in colonies of white settlement, while they slowly increased along with income per-capita in the other two types of colonies. In the former set of colonies Africans also experienced a decline in institutional quality with mass insecurity of property rights though elsewhere institutional change was muted. Europeans did bring new institutions, forms of rule, fiscal systems and financial institutions, but these did not reach the vast mass of the population.
Mechanisms
The literature has proposed various types of mechanisms via which colonialism influenced On the negative side many different mechanisms have been suggested via which colonialism reduced development. An earlier generation of scholars (e.g Rodney, 1981 ) emphasized the sheer looting of African societies by the colonial powers which undoubtedly took place, particularly in the Congo. More recently scholars point to the perverse effects of particular colonial institutions, such as agricultural marketing boards (Bates, 1981) . They also argue that the arbitrary state system created and defended by European powers has led to political conflicts, instability and dictatorship (Engelbert, 2000) . Another argument is that the colonial authorities created "gate-keeper states" which were only interested in ruling rather than in developing the countries and these have left a path dependent legacy in the state structures of post colonial Africa (Cooper, 2002) . Others have proposed that the political authoritarianism of the colonial state is a direct source of the authoritarianism that has plagued Africa since independence (Young, 1994) . Finally, and more subtly, there are arguments about how colonial rule shaped identities and created cleavages where none existed or hardened pre-existing distinctions and identities, as in Rwanda (see Ranger, 1985 , for an illustration from colonial Rhodesia and Spear, 2003 , for an overview of the British cases). This could easily have itself been an independent source of conflict and underprovision of public goods after independence. To take perhaps the most salient example, most academic studies agree the distinctions and conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, though they pre-dated colonialism (Vansina, 2004) , were made considerably worse by the fact that the German and Belgian colonial administrations recognized the Tutsis as a governing elite and after 1932 introduced identify cards that defined one as either Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. Though such identity cards
were not unique in colonial Africa (South African pass cards recorded one's "group") it seems undeniable that these policies played a significant role in intensifying Hutu-Tutsi tensions and ultimately leading to a genocide in which 800,000 people perished (Des Forges, 1999 , Mamdani, 2002 . The identity cards were only abolished in the wake of the genocide. This too is part of the legacy of colonialism for development.
Doing justice to all of these different mechanisms is impossible in the short space of a paper and we have tried to introduce quite a few of these as we have gone along. We have already seen from the work of Fedderke and his collaborators that there seem to have been no consistent tendency for either basic political or economic institutions to improve during the colonial period. Let us restrict attention to just the important issues of slavery. The colonial project in the 19th century was heavily motivated by such apparent goals as the eradication of slavery and the fact that slavery did disappear in most African colonies during the colonial period could be chalked up as an institutional improvement which colonialism brought which would otherwise not have happened. To assess this argument one has to take into account several things. First, it took a long time to abolish slavery in most African colonies. For example, in Sierra Leone it was only finally made illegal in 1928 , in Ghana 1930 and in Nigeria 1936 (see Lovejoy and Hogendorn, 1993 , on northern Nigeria and the essays in Miers and Roberts eds., 1988, and Klein and Miers eds., 1998). Second, even then it is not clear to what extent slavery vanished because of these laws (which had to be enforced) or because of economic changes. At least in the Ghanaian case such changes had little to do with the colonial powers (see Austin, 2008) . Third, the colonial state extensively used forced labor to build infrastructure (see Mason, 1978, and Thomas, 1973 , on Nigeria and Ghana). implausible.
The Balance of the Evidence
So far we have argued that though colonialism had uniform effects, one can make clear distinctions between three types of African colonies. Those which coincided, usually coincidentally, with pre-colonial African polities, the colonies of white settlement and finally those which either had no centralized states or were a heterogeneous mixture (like Nigeria) and or lacked white colonization.
Putting the evidence and arguments about counter-factuals and mechanisms together we argue that in first and second sorts of colonies there is a clear case to be made for colonialism retarding development. Making this case entails counter-factuals for both the colonial and post-colonial period. In the introduction we proposed some simple ones, based really on continuity with the pre-colonial experience. In colonies which coincided with relatively centralized polities there was the essentials of order and public goods provision which could have been the basis for development (Warner, 1999) . Botswana is a perfect case. Though Botswana has been an African success since independence it is likely that absent British colonialism Botswana would be a great deal more developed today. Prior to the colonial period Tswana elites were already reforming institutions and
showing an extraordinary ability to negotiate with external forces, traits which reproduced themselves after independence. Yet during the colonial period institutional reform was held in check in Botswana and instead chiefs and elites had to fight a rearguard action to stop such forces as indirect rule and mining from destroying their polities and the fruits of their previous institutional innovations. At the same time the British provided more or less nothing in terms of education, health, infrastructure or other types of public goods. After independence Botswana was able to benefit from its coherence as a polity and because the pre-colonial institutions which persisted were ones that promoted accountability. Generally, there is a negative correlation in Africa between pre-colonial political centralization and the extent of such accountability institutions (for example using the data in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, see Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2012) and the state in Rwanda, for example, lacked the type of accountability mechanisms the Tswana had. Nevertheless, it is overwhelmingly plausible that Botswana would be much more developed today had it not been colonized. Variation in the region supports this claim. Botswana did better than Lesotho, which had very similar pre-colonial institutions, because it was able to preserve its pre-colonial systems of representation and political institutions which were heavily distorted by indirect rule and the desire to mobilize labor for the mines in South Africa in the latter country (Ashton, 1947 , Eldredge, 2002 , Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2003 .
Another polity in this first set, Rwanda, is also very plausibly less developed than it would otherwise have been. The dominant mechanism is that it suffered the most extreme example of colonial powers shaping identities in ways which guaranteed intense conflicts for power after independence. In Rwanda this tragically interacted with what were already highly hierarchical class relations by African standards to completely discredit the traditional political system and create intense conflict.
In Ghana, also in this class, it would not have been possible to create the type of cleavage that tore Rwanda apart, but instead colonialism created a situation where a large centralized state, Asante, was placed into a "nation state" consisting of a plethora of groups who lacked a national identity and working social contract and saw Asante dominance as the main threat. The arrival of British colonialism stopped Asante expanding and Asante chiefs were made into the tools of indirect rule and to the extent that they were accountable to their people, they became less so. At independence politics became dominated by Kwame Nkrumah and his Conventional People's Party which found a common cause in opposing Asante. Nkrumah moved to emasculate the Asante chiefs (Rathbone, 2000) and initiated a cycle of anti-Asante and pro-Asante regimes. The fight for power after 1957 led to political instability, coups, military rule, the expropriation of the cocoa farmers who were at the heart of the most dynamic sector of the economy. The nature and structure of this conflict was entirely a legacy of the colonial state. In the absence of colonialism a plausible counterfactual is that Asante would have expanded and formed a "nation state". This might not have been developmental, but it certainly would have avoided the perverse institutional dynamics of indirect rule (moving the traditional leaders further from being accountable) and it would not have led to the political instability which plagued the country and undermined the economy for 25 years. Today the two main political parties revolve around this cleavage. In Uganda the situation is quite similar with pro and anti-Buganda cleavages, while in Burkina Faso it is a pro or anti-Mossi cleavage.
Accepting these arguments could it have been that colonialism brought enough to Ghana to offset these negative mechanisms? We believe the answer is no. The economic growth of Ghana during the colonial period was not because of the British colonial states but inspite of it (Hill, 1963 , Austin, 2005 . The export dynamism was a wholly African development which would plausibly have occurred without British intervention since the area had seen export dynamism before in the 19th century, for example in the export of slaves and then kola nuts and other tropical products. Other economic institutions, such as the allocation and regulation of land, were probably made less efficient by colonialism since indirect rule made the chiefs in charge of them less accountable (Colson, 1971, Goldstein and Udry, 2008 The other clear case for colonialism retarding development is in the colonies of white settlement.
Here, as we have documented, the extractive nature of colonial rule and mass expropriation of land manifested itself in serious immizerization of Africans during the colonial period and a massive increase in inequality. There is some conflicting evidence on some of these cases as we have pointed out and there is clearly important research to do here to reconcile these different sources of information. It is possible that in settler colonies, because whites came en masse, they actually brought more potential benefits. We discussed one earlier when we asked how could one reconcile falling real wages for Africans with Moradi's evidence for increased stature in Kenya. Having a lot of whites might have created positive externalities for Africans absent in colonies such as Sierra Leone.
We accept that this might be the case, so that ultimately there were offsetting benefits for Africans once they recovered from the immizerization. By the 1950s African wages were rising in Zimbabwe, as they were in South Africa by the 1970s. From this point on, and especially after independence, they might have been able to benefit from the legacy of the more intense colonization (though in fact Fedderke's research thus far does not suggest great institutional benefits in these colonies relative to others). Yet these examples suggest that there are far more powerful countervailing mechanisms at work. Since 1980 Zimbabwe has experienced not the benefits of white rule but the consequences in terms of inequality and conflicts and a legacy of racial discrimination which Sierra Leone did not have to suffer from. These cases therefore demonstrate some of the most perverse post-independence dynamics. van de Walle (2009) and Bowden and Mosley (2010) argue that this is precisely due to the very high levels of inequality in such countries which were directly a result of the way that they were colonized. We therefore believe that, despite some of the contradictory facts, to argue in these cases Though one could argue in either way, we believe the probable answer is again no. Yes railways were constructed, but as in Ghana, they were positioned not to develop the country but to rule it. Indeed, after the Hut Tax Rebellion of 1898 the route of the railway was changed with a view of controlling Mendeland, the heart of the rebellion. Yes schools were built but little pretense was made to educate the population. Bo school was focused on educating the sons of the Paramount Chiefs and the elite which the British had themselves created and who were used to govern the colony indirectly. As in and eventually a one party state. All this disintegrated in 1991 into a horrific 10 year civil war at least one motivation for which was animosity against the local despotism of chiefs and political exclusion (Richards, 1996 , Keen, 2005 . Certainly in 2012 development outcomes in Sierra Leone are better than they were in 1896 when the colony was formed, but little of this was due to the direct intervention of the British during the colonial period. Much more was due to missionaries or other forms of dissemination while the very negative development dynamics experienced after 1961 are closely related to the way the British formed and governed the colony. It is clear moreover that colonies of this type had independent dynamics that might have offset the potential benefits. The fact that they lacked centralized political authority prior to colonization created opportunities for colonial rule to bring benefits as we have observed. Yet at the same time this created a more intense indirect rule which persisted after independence precisely because there was no large pre-colonial polity. In Ghana the remnants of the Asante state was too threatening to his power for Nkrumah to rule indirectly, this was not true in Sierra Leone where to this day indirect rule is the favored method for national politicians to rule the rural areas. Though no doubt every case has its differences, even this apparently ambiguous case does not support an optimistic interpretation of the impact of colonialism on development in Africa.
Conclusions
In this essay we have tried to evaluate the impact of European colonialism on development in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Though this is only a very small part of colonial experiences in world history it covers all of the methodological problems involved in answering this question and spans many of the potential mechanisms. As we emphasized right at the start, at our current level of understanding it is impossible to make general strong claims about the causal impact of colonialism on development because of the absence of a well defined counter-factual. We argued in general this is not much of a drawback because colonialism was such a heterogeneous phenomenon that it is not very interesting to be able to identify the average effect of colonialism and in any case examining specific mechanisms may be more productive and easier to identify econometrically.
Nevertheless, we have also argued that the extent of the heterogeneity of the colonial experience in Africa is much less than in the entire colonial world. This being the case we have not restricted ourselves simply to the important task of giving an overview of some of the facts and the mechanisms which have been suggested. We have also attempted to give a very subjective and
speculative view of what we believe the balance of evidence says in the light of what we argue are plausible counter-factuals. We do this without any pretence of being definitive and merely to try to move the debate forward. In particular we emphasized that to evaluate the impact of colonialism on development it is not enough to show that development outcomes improved during the colonial period. This is for at least two reasons; first, we do not know what would have happened in the absence of colonialism; second, a full evaluation of the impact of colonialism must take into account how development outcomes after independence were shaped by the way colonialism structured society.
Our conclusions are that the case for the pessimists about the impact of colonialism on development is far stronger than the case for the optimists. There are clear cases, such as the settler colonies or colonies which coincided with established pre-colonial centralized states, where the preponderance of evidence and plausible argument supports the idea that colonialism retarded development. Other cases are more ambiguous, but even there we argue that it is difficult to come up with convincing scenarios under which colonialism promoted development. Though colonialism was indeed heterogeneous, in the end, it is very likely that if one could estimate the average effect of colonialism on development in Africa, it would be negative.
We make these arguments accepting that Africa was poor, technologically backward and poorly developed (in terms of the measures we have discussed in this paper) in the first half of the 19th century. Nevertheless, other parts of the world were also poor and underdeveloped in this period, for example Japan or Thailand and most parts of Latin America, and they are much more prosperous than Africa today. It is possible for societies to change their institutions and move onto better development paths though it is not of course inevitable that they will do so. European colonialism did bring some proximate benefits in terms of technology, a sort of peace and a sort of access to and implantation of modern institutions. Yet little attempt was really made to make such benefits, such as they were, endure, and many of which, like peace, were restricted to the colonial period. Europeans also brought racism, discrimination, inequality and seriously warped many African political and 
